Donald Davidson:

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             The second premise, the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, claims that cases of causation require laws to say event "A" caused event "B", is to say that there is a law that holds that events like "A" are typically followed by events like "B". Not that when event "A" takes place it is always followed by event "B". .
             The third and final premise, the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, claims that there are no strict links involving mental kinds. For Davidson there is a contradiction in the premises. Premise one and two deny the truth of the third premise. Davidson states, .
             "Nevertheless it is natural to reason that the first two principles, that of causal interaction, and that of the Nomological character of causality, together imply that a least some mental events can be predicted and explained on the basis of laws, while the principle of the anomalism of the mental denies this.".
             Davidson uses two main ideas to do away with the contradiction. First, he argues for a vulnerable explanation of the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality. And secondly, he rules out mental descriptions from participating in strict causal laws. With the ruling out of mental descriptions and premises one and two, provides truth for Davidson's non-reductive identity theory.
             Davidson claims that causal laws cannot cover every singular causal claim. When there is a true singular causal claim, such as "A" caused "B", it is not necessarily the case that the relevant causal law is formulated in terms of the descriptions "A" and "B". For example, a claim such as, Al Gore lost the election by a small margin caused him to call for a recount. The events could be a true singular causal event but we would not want an underlying law to be calculated for the people who voted in the election and who they voted for but instead we would want a law, defined for the physical events that Al Gore to call for a recount.