Moreover, you are not responsible for this man's sickness from his bad kidneys. If you were, you would have to let him use yours. However, you are, of course, responsible for the bullet in his brain, for the damage you caused to his body. Thus, supposing that the violinist does not have a right to be hooked up to you, still the case is that you may do whatever you want to him. Judith Thompson, stated, "The man has a right to his life," She focuses her attention on whether he has a right to what it would take to sustain his life. However, what she fails to notice, is that even if he does not have a right, this does not imply that whatever one does to him is morally permissible. In the same way-that the fetus does not have a right to use the woman's body unless she gives it to him-does not imply that whatever one does to the fetus is morally permissible. Rather, just as one may not stab the violinist in the throat or shoot him in the head, causing such severe damage to his body that death occurs, furthermore, one may not cut the fetus into pieces or poison him to death. Thus, all Judith Thompson can hope to infer from the violinist example is that one may "disconnect" oneself from the fetus providing one does not fatally damage his body in the process. This means that of the six methods of abortion only those cases of prostaglandin chemical abortion (where the woman's uterus is stimulated to contract and expel the fetus whole) in which the fetus is born alive and is not decapitated or fatally damaged by the violence of the contractions, and those cases of cesarean section abortion where the fetus dies of neglect rather than by the knife, that only these cases are possibly morally permissible types of abortion. Only those cases where the fetus is not fatally damaged by the procedure might be permissible (on Judith Thompson's showing), for only such procedures might be cases of "disconnecting" oneself from a person.
