1979). In addition, non-verbal cues to the subject are not always.
adequately controlled and even sensory cues are sometimes present. For.
example, the cards used in Rhine's early work could in fact be read from.
the back under certain lighting conditions (Hansel, 1979).
Hansel points to another reason for skepticism of ESP research. This is.
the difficulty in replicating results with different participants, not only by.
disinterested researchers, but by ESP enthusiasts, including Rhine.
Successful replication is essential in order to rule out the possibility of.
error or fraud. One possible reply to this criticism is that the participants in.
the experiment must be favourably disposed toward ESP. Failure to.
replicate could be defended by an ESP supporter by saying that too many.
of the participants in the new experiment were nonbelievers. Which such.
a reply is unappealing in that it means that any result can be defended,.
there have nevertheless been experiments which purport to show that.
believers perform better in ESP tasks than do non-believers (e.g.,.
Dshmeidler, 1943; Kahn, 1952; Bhadra, 1969). In addition, L.E. Rhine.
(1971) has demonstrated that participants improved their ESP.
performance after their attitude to ESP was made more positive as a.
result of a talk given by the experimenter.
The aim of the present study, then, is to examine whether believers differ.
from non-believers in a pre-cognition task (predicting the outcome of a.
coin toss). According to the previously reported findings, it should be.
found that believers perform significantly better than chance, while nonbelievers.
perform either at or below chance level.
METHOD.
Design.
The study used a preexperimental design to assess whether ESP belief.
affected precognition accuracy. Two groups of participants, "believers-.
and "non believers-, comprised the levels of the belief variable.
"Believers- were those who responded "yes- to the question "Have you.
ever had an experience which makes you believe that extrasensory.
