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s search for a cause in the July Crisis of 1914. The July 1914 crisis started with the diplomatic ultimatum that Austro-Hungary gave Serbia. The rest of the European powers, galvanized in the various alliance systems, where overwhelmed. Thus, Germany was offering unquestioned support to the Hapsburgs, even if it was to be military, whilst knowing that the Russians were objecting to any use of force against Serbia and threatening their intervention. France seemed confused, but was ready to support Russian intervention against Austria-Hungary. Britain, pressured both by France and Russia, was undecided until it officially announced its military support to them. In the end, according to Joll, in July "events were moving too fast for the diplomats because the decisions were now more and more being taken by the soldiers." What had started as a diplomatic crisis had resulted in military action. The second causal factor offered by Joll is the Alliance System between the Great Powers. Germany was thus allied with Austria-Hungary. France and Russia had their own pact. Adding to these treaties, aiming for a Balance of Power, where the secret ententes between England and France, and England and Russia. The result was a military and political planning that depended, or was strengthened by this polarization of the two camps: The Alliance and The Entente. The various treaties thus "provided the framework within which the diplomacy of the pre-war years was conducted." Thirdly, Joll analyzed pre-war militarism and strategic planning. Germany, militaristic, had increased its naval program enough as to lead to "a radical change in British strategic thinking." The British were involved in the usual strategic planning aiming at securing their access to the Empire and, in the end, the arms race "contributed to the feeling that war was inevitable." French militarism was aiming at increasing the draft term, whereas the Russian military recovery from the 1905 loss to the Japanese was "alarming the Germans". All major powers had anticipated war, and the pre-war planning, such as the Schlieffen Plan, exacerbated everything. The Powers were ready for the conflict, had planned for it, and when the crisis came, diplomatic thinking was bypassed by military critical readiness. Fourthly, Joll examined the importance of domestic policies, which, according to several historians, could have influenced foreign policy decisions. Every Great Power was "passing through a political and social crisis in 1914." The Austro-Hungarian Empire was losing its geopolitical integrity; Britain had to deal with the Ulster Irish question that was about to overspill; France had as issues taxation and the Three-Year service issue. Nevertheless, Joll points out that domestic policies played a part, but not a big one as to lead to war. Ultimately, politicians did not "deliberately embarked on war as a way out of their insoluble domestic, social and political problems." Economic rivalries were another factor that Joll examined. He indicated that "not all imperialistic policies were inspired by direct economic interests." Although economic interest had often lead to strategic frictions between the Great Powers, in the end "economic interests were not too much […] in the minds of the politicians" in July 1914. To minimize the role of economic calculations vis-à-vis a war, Joll indicated that the opponents had not "taken into account the economic consequences and needs of a war." Governments thus did not embark on war in order to satisfy private or budgetary financial interests. Regarding Imperialism, Joll pointed out that, although it did increase in pace between 1880 and 1900, it was not the immediate cause for war. Britain had an Empire to defend; Russia was pushing in the Middle East and was already present in Persia; Italy wanted to live up to its glorious past and Germany wanted to create its own sea power, or Weltpolitik. Yet, despite obvious opposing aims, the Great Powers we

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