HEU is easy to handle: "In small masses HEU is so benign that you could sleep with it under your pillow if you so desired" (22). Yet the blossoming chain reaction caused by about 100 lbs of 90% weapons grade enriched HEU is enough to destroy several city blocks. (23). It is so scarcely detectable that it may be shielded lightly to escape radiation monitors. And unfortunately, nations require an arsenal to possess "nuclear muscle," yet small groups only require one or two bombs to accomplish their goals.
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Highly enriched uranium is scarcely found on the black market, but there is a massive accumulation of it in Russia "an estimate of 2 million pounds (27). During the early 1990's, this supply became neglected from protection "sometimes being guarded only by padlocks. Langewiesche explains, "Russia did have loose nukes and still today presents the best opportunities for anyone trying to acquire fissile material- (49).
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Langewiesche assures that it would be nearly impossible for a terrorist group to infiltrate a nuclear city, such as Ozersk, without detection. But it would only require the cooperation of one or two workers from the nuclear city of Mayak : "Any of thousands of ordinary workers at Mayak could update them and also provide information on material-processing schedules, NNSA upgrades, broken cameras, the patterns of the night shifts, and the locations of guards who use narcotics or drink on the job."" (43). Also, the radiation monitors are ineffective at this site, since virtually everything in the area is already radiated. These monitors are even disengaged to avoid the nuisance of constant alarm, since even radiated fish are enough to cause notice. .
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There is also a lack of accounting in these nuclear facilities. This problem is gradually being rectified, but much of the nuclear inventory cannot be accounted for, since it was not thoroughly tracked after the Cold War.
