" Zhukov said "war is waged with skill. Not people's lives," technical inferiority of the Red Army meant they were fighting a superior force for much of the war, large casualties were almost inevitable. Numerical advantage was important however it was more the proficient utilization of that advantage that was "key to victory" .
Zhukov and Reformation of the Army.
Soviet victory owed more to a reformation of armed forces command than "oft cited exaggerated numerical superiority." The catastrophic losses after Operation Barbarossa became the catalyst for radical reformations of the army. Titles of seniority, seen as a relic from the Tsarist era, were re-introduced. To solve the dearth of experienced command there was the rehabilitation of 4,000 officers who had been sent to Gulag's. Circular 01 eliminated the corps military rank, seeking to remedy the bloated a bureaucratic chain of command by allowing experienced commanders to have more direct control over their units. "Soviet military effectiveness" was aided by the reintroduction unitary command as Political Commissars were reduced in status to deputies. The Red Army were aided by an "exceptional and necessary improvement" in deception. In the Steppe Front, troops were concealed whilst in the Voronzeh Front dummy troop concentrations misled German aerial reconnaissance. .
The revolution in command is epitomized in the figure of General Zhukov: given greater freedom for decision making, "the man who beat Hitler" proved to be a formidable tactician. Eisenhower described Zhukov's role as "crucial to victory in Europe." A "genius of strategy" his excellent tactical command repelled a Japanese incursion at Khalkhin-Gol, Mongolia. Japanese archives reveal that it was this crushing defeat that was instrumental in their decision not to attack Russia in 1941. Had they attacked, it is unlikely the Soviet Union could have survived a war on two fronts.
