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The Concorde began with a 1958 report on the possibilities of SST by British aircraft designers and with the 1959 commitment to SST by Harold M. Macmillan's cabinet. The British feared being left behind in civilian aeronautics and still smarted from the eclipse of the ill-fated De Havilland Comet jetliner by the Boeing 707 and Douglas Commercial 8. The British wrongly assumed that the U.S. intended a commercial derivative of its supersonic B-58 Hustler and B-70 Valkyrie bombers. They hoped for U.S. collaboration, but were rebuffed and turned instead to the French. By 1962, the British and French saw advantages in a joint SST apart from cost-sharing. The British hoped to ease their way into the Common Market, and French President Charles DeGaulle "viewed Concorde as an important step in demonstrating the technical competence required of a major power," as the Central Intelligence Agency argued in 1966 (p. 69). .
The Concorde prompted American commercial SST work. When Pan American Airlines signed options for six Concordes in 1963, President John F. Kennedy ordered an aggressive SST program under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) auspices, saying that he wanted to "beat that bastard De Gaulle" (p. 43). Kennedy advisors, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in particular, doubted SST's viability. But others, led by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, were enthusiastic. Some advisors worried about the Concorde's possible effect on America's balance of payments. They also worried about a Soviet SST. The Tupelov 144's limits were exposed, however, by a devastating crash at the 1971 Paris Air Show. American analysts saw the Concorde's head start as an actual blessing. Americans could take advantage of lessons learned across the Atlantic and build a larger and faster (Mach 3) SST without any of the debilitating handicaps the French and British experienced trying to coordinate a program of such complexity across national and cultural lines.