The Gallipoli campaign of 1915 was probably the one great strategic idea of WW1. If the Dardanelle's and the Gallipoli peninsula could have been captured by the allies, then Constantinople would have fallen and Turkey would have been knocked out of the war. This would have rendered later campaigns such as in Palestine unnecessary and would have certainly shortened the war by at least a year, kept Czarist Russia in the war and probably would have prevented the communist revolution of 1917 in Russia. The campaign, however, was doomed to failure due to the lack of preparation, leadership, and the faults of the system.
Churchill must shoulder much of the blame for the failure at Gallipoli as he should have recognised that naval gunfire alone would not reduce or capture Turkish force and merely led to the loss of both lives, and the vital element of surprise needed for victory in any war. The Russian government is also to blame because of their rejection of Greek troops when the Greek government offered them. So the first attempt was solely naval, ending with the loss of at least three battleships and only serving to alert the Turks to the current situation.
Kitchener, the minister of war also much be blamed for the failure of Gallipoli as he first apposed sending troops into Gallipoli after the naval bombardment and then, once agreeing with the idea, chose the wrong generals to lead them. He refused to allow a suitable landing craft to be transferred to the Mediterranean for the Gallipoli operation. He never set up proper logistics or communication staff for the operation.
The general Kitchener selected was General Hamilton, who underestimated and had contempt for the Turks; he showed an ignorance of strategy particularly in relation to the topographic features of Gallipoli. As Hamilton found many of his subornment generals incompetent he tended to do nothing (which in part reflects the eticate of British generals of the time) and he tended to give suggestions rather then orders.
