Moreover, in referring to McFague in such a positive way (i.e., "McFague's provocative suggestion" (GNG, 120)), it seems that Lodahl implicitly finds agreement or at least strong sympathy with the notion that the world is "God's body". This conclusion is further supported in Lodahl's discussion of omnipresence ("God being fully and 'intimately present - - - in every place' ") and omniscience ("God knowing thoroughly and intimately all things and events in utter clarity and unimaginable thoroughness" (GNG, 122)). In the context of his understanding of these two terms, Lodahl writes: "we are again led to something like McFague's model of the universe as God's body. God does not know any event "at 'a distance', but from within, and indeed through the experiences (conscious or not) of all creatures (sentient or not", (GNG, 122)). This statement appears to be very similar to Hartshorne's panpsychism and that every object in creation is like a nerve muscle in God (HPS, 450-451 & MVGLT, 185).3.
Lodahl comments in his critique that the language he uses that "something like McFague's model of the universe as God's Body" does not imply "an aim of theological exactitude" (RRE, 142). He insists that his use of the phrase the world as "God's body" is not a "hardened proposition" or "not the prose of hard claims being offered as propositional truth" (RRE, 142). The downside of Lodahl's claim here is that he can use language rather vaguely and when challenged about the implications he can then accuse his critic of "epistemological" or "theological" exactitude (RRE, 142). In so doing, Lodahl avoids dealing with the implications of the model of the "universe as God's body". In my critique of his ideas this is exactly what I was attempting to do, to draw out implications of a process interpretation of the world being God's body, which Lodahl seems to largely accept.
