Thus, a policy of non-aggression could carry with it the same consequences as a defeat in military action against Quemoy and Matsu. The defeat of a large military action campaign against Quemoy (i.e. invasion) could lead to a renewed sense of strength on the part of the Nationalists and a further strengthening of Quemoy and other offshore positions. If the PRC attempted and failed at an invasion of these islands, the consequences would be quite significant. A failure would lead to some type of de-facto ceasefire being pursued on the part of the communists, because of the implications that a full scale invasion of the islands has (which will be explained in more detail later). However, in the face of non-action, the consequences of a military solution seemed more inviting. At least with military action, the PRC might be able to control the outcome of these actions. Passive acquiescence to the Nationalists" encampment on Quemoy would let Chiang control the situation. .
Aside from the issues of military actions against Quemoy and the possible threat that Quemoy actually posed to the communists, domestic factors also played in the mind of the communist leaders. During the summer and fall of 1958 Mao was attempting to mobilize the population for his Great Leap Forward. This mobilization could be helped along by the instigation of a conflict, especially since the internal media was so tightly controlled that Mao could spin the conflict in order to gain popular support. A conflict over Quemoy would serve to mobilize the people and to stimulate the large-scale production endeavors that Mao envisioned. The tension created through shelling the islands would consolidate Mao's power and support basis. Mao placed military commanders in the communes to supervise the militarization and mobilization of each commune. The communes (Mao hoped, though this never really materialized) would produce light weapons (rifles, machine guns, mortars) and to form militias out of every able bodied person.
