Thus, they put forward to battle protectively, planning to slow down destruction sufficiently long enough to get outside foreign aid, mitigated after the Battle of Saratoga. .
The British, then again, were loaded down with supplies and arms. Because of this capability to do so, and the dwindling of the ports they controlled in America, they sought to end the war quickly. Boston, New York, and Quebec turned out to be profitable to the British amid the war as a result of the way supplies could be effectively directed to troops from these ports (Furneaux, R. 1971). New York and Boston granted near complete control of their surrounding areas, and Quebec, with its connection to the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes, gave the British easy access to the North. Yet gradually, as the colonists became more grounded, the British got to be berserk in extending their supply lines to reach inward colonial resistance. Such could lead to disaster, such as the when Nathanael Greene drew Conwallis' British forces out from Chesapeake ports to a disaster for the British at Yorktown. Cornwallis had looked to move to New York for help when his supply line to southern ports became too thin. The British needed to accomplish a quick victory, one that happened before their supply framework fizzled and before the Americans could increase foreign aid. .
Foreign point of view of the American Revolution was changed at the Battle of Saratoga. The British had arranged a British Colonel St. Leger and Generals Burgoyne and Howe to shape a three prong assault, meeting at Saratoga, to partitioned New England, particularly Boston, from whatever remains of the settlements (Furneaux, R. 1971). On the other hand, because of the colonial armed force slowing down St. Leger with guerilla fighting and Howe's obsession with Philadelphia and refusal to conform to past arrangements, Burgoyne was compelled to battle Benedict Arnold at Ticonderoga alone (Nardo, D.