As the co-driver did not intentionally set out to kill the driver, he did not act morally wrong as he only killed the driver out of mercy. However if the co-driver were to believe in the difference thesis and had not acted to lessen the drivers suffering, letting the driver die from the fire even when the driver pleaded to be shot, the co-driver can be held morally accountable for increasing suffering in the driver's life. It can therefore be seen as being more morally righteous to have killed the driver than rather allowing him to die by natural forces. Since death is not always an evil, as assumed by Nesbitt, his difference thesis is deemed erroneous. .
Even though killing is not always worse than letting die, this does not mean that all cases of letting die are equally as bad as killing. When we compare cases of killing such as murder to cases of letting die, such as passive euthanasia, it is obvious that we consider the killing to be worse than letting die even though both outcomes involve the death of an individual. Therefore it is said by Rachels (2001, p. 947) that the 'difference between killing and letting die does not itself make a difference to the moral assessment of the actions' but it is instead assessed by other aspects such as the worth of an individual's life and the amount of time that individual has to live, if we were not to interfere. So in this instance killing via murder is only worse because we are actively trying to end someone's life for our personal gain whereas in passive euthanasia it is more out of compassion. Given parallel examples, it is easy for us to conclude that there are no moral distinction between killing and letting die. One example given by Rachels (1975) is the nasty cousin's example. Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns his cousin who is taking a bath in order to inherit a large sum of money. In the second case, which is exactly like the first, but instead Jones who is about to drown his cousin sees him slip and fall into the water.
