THE CUBAN missile crisis has had important long-term effects.
government, and I presume in the Soviet government as well, were.
thinking ahead to the future. For example, I had argued for a tough stand on the removal of the.
missiles and the bombers, but also for movement toward a reduction in tensions after resolution.
of the crisis. In the memoranda of October 25 and 27, I suggested that the United States should,.
"while solving the Cuban base question with determination, forcefully reaffirm its readiness to.
reach agreements on arms control and disarmament" and other broader diplomatic arrangements.
(Appendix documents B and C). Those doves who argued most strongly for seeking to resolve.
the crisis through diplomatic means sought not only to find matching concessions, but also to.
use the occasion to advance a more far-reaching political agenda. By contrast, most hawks.
opposed any move toward a d* ©tente. There were, however, also those, including myself, who.
favored a tough stand on the question of removal of the offensive weapons, but also hoped that.
in the aftermath there could be movement toward a d* ©tente in U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus in.
another memorandum to Alexis Johnson, on October 29, on the "Significance of the Soviet.
Backdown for Future U.S. Policy," while calling for strength, I also stated "it is vitally important.
that the U.S. take the initiative in offering to negotiate on major issues between East and West".
(Appendix document F). .
President Kennedy included in his key letter of October 27, as an incentive to Khrushchev, a.
statement that once the crisis was settled, the effect on easing tensions would make possible.
STAGE 6 The Afterlife .
THE MISSILE crisis not only had an aftermath in its effects on subsequent U.S.-Soviet.
relations (and Soviet-Cuban relations, and indirectly other developments not reviewed here), but.